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The Delay-Match-to-Sample (DMS) task has been used in countless studies of memory,
undergoing numerous modifications, making the task more and more challenging to
participants. The physiological correlate of memory is modified neural activity during
the cue-to-match delay period reflecting reverberating attractor activity in multiple
interconnected cells. DMS tasks may use a fixed set of well-practiced stimulus
images—allowing for creation of attractors—or unlimited novel images, for which no
attractor exists. Using well-learned stimuli requires that participants determine if a
remembered image was seen in the same or a preceding trial, only responding to the
former. Thus, trial-to-trial transitions must include a “reset” mechanism to mark old
images as such. We test two groups of monkeys on a delay-match-to-multiple-images
task, one with well-trained and one with novel images. Only the first developed a reset
mechanism. We then switched tasks between the groups. We find that introducing
fixed images initiates development of reset, and once established, switching to novel
images does not disable its use. Without reset, memory decays slowly, leaving ∼40%
recognizable after a minute. Here, presence of reward further enhances memory of
previously-seen images.
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INTRODUCTION
The field of memory is the subject of intense attention and
research effort, with thousands of papers devoted to this impor-
tant, exciting field. Particular attention is paid to understanding
neural substrates of memory and modeling memory mechanisms
with physiologically realistic components and behavioral capaci-
ties. Nevertheless, relatively little effort has gone into study of the
complementary process of required forgetting. Some studies may
have analyzed forgetting as not remembering, but we are inter-
ested more in active forgetting, in cases where it is better to forget;
(see below, Summary and Conclusions, for studies of directed for-
getting). Any step towards, understanding how we forget would
help us understand memory, at least constraining possible mem-
ory models. A breakthrough in understanding forgetting may also
be of great clinical significance. A central goal of the current study
was to study primate forgetting in performance of a task which
was specifically devised so that good performance requires a level
of forgetting, and comparing it to performance of a comparable
task which does not. We ask how efficient is forgetting, and how
effective when not required at all.
The Delay-Match-to-Sample (DMS) task has been used in
countless studies of human and animal memory (Ferster, 1960).
The task has gone though a number of modifications, making the
task more and more challenging to the participant, as demon-
strated in Figure 1. The physiological correlate of memory of
the cue during the delay period or periods before presentation
of the match stimulus, called delay activity, is an elevated (or
perhaps diminished) level of neural activity following stimulus
presentation (Fuster and Alexander, 1971; Kubota and Niki, 1971;
Fuster and Jervey, 1981; Goldman-Rakic, 1995; Wang, 2001). It
is assumed that delay activity recorded in one neuron reflects
such activity in multiple interconnected cells and that enhanced
synaptic interconnectivity in this set underlies long-lasting rever-
berating delay activity, called attractor activity (Amit, 1995; Amit
and Brunel, 1997). It was found that a stimulus must be presented
many times (∼100 times) to develop delay activity for that stimu-
lus (Miyashita and Chang, 1988; Erickson and Desimone, 1999),
presumably by strengthening synapses among neurons in the set.
Thus, delay period attractor activity reflects an image being in
active Working Memory, while the underlying strengthening of
the synapses reflects more permanent long-term memory. This
long-term memory synaptic substrate is essential for enabling
initiation and maintenance of the Working Memory neuronal
activity (Amit, 1995; Amit and Brunel, 1997). In a separate
accompanying paper we describe an attractor network model that
can accommodate these different tasks (by properly modulating
noise and inhibition), and that employs simple mechanisms for
readout of the match and for memory reset (Amit et al., 2013).
A common feature of experimentation with the variety of
DMS tasks has been use of a fixed set of well-practiced images
as visual stimuli. This allows acquaintance with the stimuli, as
required to build up delay activity. But this advantage comes at
a cost: Using well-learned stimuli presents a challenge for the par-
ticipant who must determine if the remembered image was seen
in the same trial or in a preceding trial. Only a match to an image
seen in the same trial should trigger a response. Thus, memory
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FIGURE 1 | Modifications of Delay-Match-to-Sample (DMS) task. (I) In
the original DMS task, the first stimulus is the cue and the second is either
a match or a non-match to the cue. Participant remembers the cue and
responds differently for match or non-match. (II) DMS with multiple
samples again requires memory of the first, cue stimulus and waiting for its
match, which may appear following multiple non-match stimuli. (III) Same
as (II), but there may appear matches to non-cue (not first) stimuli, which
should be ignored. (IV) DMS with multiple samples, any one of which may
be the cue. Participant remembers all previous stimuli of the trial, and
responds to a match to any one of them. In the examples shown for (II–IV),
there are three samples presented besides the cue and match, but this
number is variable and unknown to the participant. Symbols schematically
represent images presented as sample, cue and match. Dash represents
delay between image presentations, in our case always 1 s.
must include the trial number, or, equivalently, at the transition
from one trial to the next, all “old” images must be marked as
such: There needs to be some sort of “reset” mechanism between
trials (Yakovlev et al., 2008).
Assuming the delay activity attractor model, reset may be seen
as turning off the delay activity between trials. An important char-
acteristic of such a reset for these tasks is that it will turn off
the delay activity Working Memory of any of the images seen up
to now, so that seeing them again, in a following trial, will not
trigger a motor response. At the same time, such a reset would
not destroy the long-term memory synaptic structure acquired
through the learning process. The images would still be able to
initiate Working Memory activity when presented as a sample in
following trials.
Thus, accepting the reverberating delay activity model, it is
easy to perceive reset as turning off this reverberation. In this
way, assuming match recognition involves comparison of active
reverberations and stimulus-initiated activity, only delay activity
which derives from images seen in the current trial will initiate
recognition of a match image. For DMS tasks I, II, and III in
Figure 1, the cue image must initiate delay activity corresponding
to this cue image for successful identification of the match. For
task III it is essential that subsequent images are not entered
into Working Memory in the same way, whereas for task II (at
least as it is traditionally reported in the literature) it is immate-
rial if subsequent images enter Working Memory since they are
never tested. However, for DMS task IV, the participant does not
know in advance which sample will be the cue image, so that
every sample must initiate an (independent) delay activity attrac-
tor, representing the corresponding presented image, so that the
match stimulus will be recognized as such. All these sets of activity
need to be reset, i.e., turned off, at trial end.
As mentioned above, we introduced a new task type (Figure 1,
DMS task IV) where all the images seen must be remembered,
since any can act as cue to be matched by the final stimulus
(Yakovlev et al., 2008). Furthermore, in addition to trials with a
small fixed set of well-trained, often seen images, we introduced
trials with an unlimited set of novel images. That is, we used new
stimulus images on every trial, images that the participant had
never seen before. There are two major predictions that may be
expected from this difference between tasks with a fixed set vs.
novel images: First of all, since the images in the novel set were
not viewed many times, there should not have been sufficient
opportunity to set up enhanced synaptic connections and there-
fore, no reverberating activity. Thus, accepting the reverberating
attractor model, one might expect that it would be impossible
to perform this task with novel images. (Note that novel images
were not used even in recent reports of persistent activity in some
prefrontal neurons of monkeys not performing a memory task
(Meyer et al., 2007). Also, this activity was turned off by subse-
quent presentation of a different image, so is irrelevant to our
multi-image memory task.) Secondly, since the images are all
novel, and images from previous trials will never appear again,
there should be no need for a reset mechanism.
However, previous studies have shown that it is easy to per-
form DMS tasks with large sets of images or even novel images. In
fact, performance is actually better with larger sets. In the study
of Mishkin and Delacour (1975 see also Eacott et al., 1994), each
trial had two parts, a pre-trial with the sample alone, and a test
with the sample and another stimulus; the monkey was trained
to remember which was this trial’s sample. They found very poor
performance when using a single pair of stimuli for all trials, and
far superior performance when using novel stimuli. They con-
cluded that it is easier to discriminate familiarity from novelty
than to remember which familiar stimulus was this trial’s sample.
One experiment by Sands and Wright (1980; see also Basile and
Hampton, 2010) had monkeys report if a probe item was among
three preceding samples. Performance was far superior for sam-
ple chosen from a pool of 200 items vs. only 6 items, suggesting
proactive interference was a major problem.
We previously tested macaque monkeys with DMS task IV,
which we call the Delay Match to Multiple Sample (DMMS) task,
first with a set of 16 fixed images, presented consistently but
in random order, and then with an infinite set of novel images
(Yakovlev et al., 2008). Despite the predicted lack of delay activity,
the monkeys were able to perform the task with novel images and
performance with novel images was better than with the fixed set
of well-practiced images. We explained this finding by suggesting
that rather than depending on delay activity, performance relied
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on simply judging whether the image were ever seen before—
familiarity memory instead of recognition memory. This was
modeled by having the cue leave a weak synaptic trace, insufficient
to trigger reverberating activity, but sufficient to create a differen-
tial response during match presentation (Yakovlev et al., 2008).
In an accompanying paper, we show that this can be seamlessly
integrated into the attractor network model forWorkingMemory
(Amit et al., 2013).
The second prediction, that with novel images there should be
no need for a reset mechanism, was also not entirely borne out:
We introduced a small number of catch trials with images from
previous trials, and found only a slightly larger number of false
positive responses here than with the fixed set of images. That is,
there was a reset mechanism used for the infinite set, as well. It
may be that a new reset mechanism was set up, or that the reset
mechanism acquired during performance of the fixed-set task was
transferred to the novel-set task and still used, though somewhat
less effectively, during performance of the subsequent novel set
task. Presumably this reset mechanism is not the turning off of
reverberating delay activity, since such activity is assumed to be
absent for novel stimuli.
These findings bring up a number of essential questions
regarding the nature of the reset mechanism. If reset is sim-
ply turning off attractor reverberations, it should not transfer
to familiarity memory of novel images. Therefore, having found
reset for novel images, suggests there may be two independent
reset mechanisms, which are either inherent or rapidly learned.
If so, we should find few False Positives (FPs) also for mon-
keys not trained on a fixed set of images before testing with
novel images. The alternative is that reset must it be acquired
or learned, and that it is transferred from fixed set training
to novel set test. Another possibility is that the monkeys in
the above-described experiment may have acquired a new reset
mechanism for the novel-images task, and that this acquisi-
tion is independent or depends on prior experience with the
reset used for the fixed-set task. If reset for novel images is
innate or can be learned very rapidly and does not require prior
experience with reset for fixed images, we might expect that
inexperienced monkeys tested with novel images will not have
many FPs. But, if reset is learned slowly, and/or requires trans-
fer or at least experience with the fixed, then we may expect that
inexperienced monkeys, tested with novel images without prior
experience with a fixed set, would not have a reset mechanism.
This should show up with a large number of False Positive (FP)
responses on catch trials. To determine which of these hypothe-
ses is to be accepted and which rejected, we now trained two
new inexperienced monkeys on the novel images task. Will they
have a reset mechanism, inherently or acquired gradually during
training?
METHODS AND PROCEDURES
Two groups of inexperienced Macaca fascicularis monkeys
learned to perform a multiple image memory task, as shown in
Figure 1IV, i.e., our extended DMS task (Yakovlev et al., 2005,
2008), where samples are sequences of images. Trial protocol
is shown in Figure 1IV, a modified, delayed-match-to multiple-
sample (DMMS) task (Yakovlev et al., 2005). A sequence of
images of random length (with two to seven images) was pre-
sented and participants reported whether any (test) image was
a repetition of any one of the previous images in the sequence.
Thus, on each trial, they were shown 1–6 sample images (n) fol-
lowed by aMatch—a repetition of one of the earlier images, which
is called the Cue. The task was to recognize and respond to Cue—
Match repetition. We randomized sequence length, Cue position
(q, from start of trial), and images presented, so that perfect per-
formance required holding in memory all of the sample images of
the current trial.
Each trial began when the monkey pressed a response bar,
following presentation of a slowly flickering small fixation point
at the screen center. The fixation point continued alone for 1 s
followed by a series of 1 s image presentation and 1 s inter-
stimulus-interval until either the monkey released the bar or the
presented image was a match to which the monkey released the
bar or failed to (during its presentation or in the 0.5 s thereafter).
Correct bar release was rewarded with a drop of apple juice (Hit);
failure to release was considered a Miss; premature bar release is a
FP. Each of these three ended the trial. Inter-trial-interval was 2 s
for correct trials or 4 s following aMiss or FP response. During the
inter-trial-interval the flickering fixation point was turned off. A
bar press during this interval prolonged it for an additional 2 s.
In one variant, the images of the sequence of every trial were
selected from a limited fixed set of 16 images, so that during train-
ing every image had been seen hundreds of times. In the other
variant, sequences were taken from an “infinite” set, so that each
image was used only once, except when it appeared a second
time in the same trial as a Cue-Match repeat, or when planted in
“catch” trials, to study FPs; see below. Any image in the sequence
of a trial (except the last) can be the Cue which will be repeated at
the end of the trial, and any image (but the first) can be this final
Match. When an image is repeated (e.g., A, B, C, C or A, B, A)
the subject is supposed to respond (and receives a juice reward
for correct response). Images were multicolored drawings, clip
art images of patterns, photographs, or cartoon-like drawings of
objects (Art Explosion), each of 200 × 200 pixels. One group was
first trained and tested on a limited fixed set of images and only
later tested with an “infinite” set. We shall call this group the Fixed
Set Trained or FST group. The second group had no experience
with limited fixed sets before training and testing with an “infi-
nite” set, and later was tested—for the first time—with a limited
fixed set. We call this group the Novel Set Trained or NST group.
Further details have been presented previously (Yakovlev et al.,
2005, 2008). Animal behavior experimentation was performed
according to National Institutes of Health and Hebrew University
guidelines.
Statistical tests for performance Hit and FP rates was based
on the data of Figures 2, 3, 5–7, (as presented in Tables in the
Supplemental Material). The Hit rate is Hits/(Hits plus Misses)
and the FP rate is FPs/(FPs plus Correct Rejections). Confidence
Intervals were calculated using Tim Ross’ Accurate Confidence
IntervalMatlab tool. Significance is judged using the binomial test
for proportions and a pooled two-sample p-test. Data for all ses-
sions of the two monkeys in each group were pooled for statistical
analysis, but we looked at individual participant data as well and
results are the same and significant for each one alone. In general
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FIGURE 2 | Experiment I, Group FST (Fixed Set Trained), tested with a
fixed set of 16 images. (A) Performance (Hit rate %), as a function of cue
position q, and thus, distance from the match stimulus, which is always the
last of the trial, for each trial length (color-coded number of samples,
n = 1,6). (B) False Positive rate (FP %), tested as a function of number of
trials back to prior appearance of image. Note somewhat higher FP rate for
1-back repetitions. Error bars are Confidence Intervals, which were ±
2–10%, depending on sample size; see Supplementary Material.
FIGURE 3 | Experiment I, Group NST (Novel Set Trained), tested with
novel images. (A) Performance (Hit Rate %); note performance is high and
independent of cue position, unlike results in Figure 2A for the FST group
tested with a fixed image set. (B) FP rate; note high FP rate compared to
Figure 2B for FST group tested with a fixed image set.
the number of trials for each condition was determined by the
need for a sufficient number of “catch” trials for the novel images
task, while keeping their rate and number low enough that they
not be noticed and learned.
RESULTS
EXPERIMENT I
In Experiment I, monkey behavior for the DMMS task was tested
with the same image sets that were used during training. The test-
ing procedure started when performance was stable and at least
80% correct.
Group FST
Performance. Monkeys B and T were tested for 4,616 trials with
a fixed set of 16 images, which had been heavily learned by them.
Performance (Hits relative to Hits plusMisses) strongly depended
on trial length, as well as on position within the trial of the cue
(the sample repeated by the match stimulus). Thus, when cue and
match were adjacent (cue position= number of samples), perfor-
mance was close to 90%; however, when a few stimuli intervened
between cue and match stimuli, performance strongly decreased.
This is shown in Figure 2A. (For all figures, data are tabulated
with their Confidence Intervals in the Supplementary Material).
False positives.Using a limited set of images leads to a large prob-
ability of the same image being repeated in close trials. If an image
is preserved in memory, then when it appears again in another
trial, as a sample, this repetition may confuse the monkey, which
may consider it a match repetition, evoking a response, which
is a FP error. Indeed, this is what occurred in numerous cases,
but only for images shown in adjacent trials, i.e., 1-back from
the current trial (9% FPs). When repeated images were shown
further than 1-back, however, the FP error rate was lower, and
independent of how far back they were from the current trial.
This is demonstrated in Figure 2B, where FP rate is the ratio of
FP relative to FP plus Correct Rejections—for each distance.
Group NST
Performance. Monkeys D and L were trained on the same
paradigm, but with an unlimited set of images. That is, in every
trial they were presented with novel, never before seen images.
One image in the current trial was randomly chosen to be
repeated as a match—the only case where an image was presented
twice. Learning this paradigm was somewhat slower than that for
the preceding method with a fixed set of trained images.
Surprisingly, performance of monkeys in Group NST (4,751
trials) was 90% or more and was significantly better than that
for monkeys who were tested with a fixed set of images (two-
sample pooled p-test; p < 0.001, for group and for each monkey
separately). Indeed performance was significantly better for all
cases (p < 0.05), except when the cue immediately preceded the
match stimulus, as demonstrated in Figure 3A. There is virtually
no dependence on cue position, i.e., on distance of the match
from the cue, as was found to be so strong for performance with
the fixed set of images; (compare Figures 2A, 3A). Here, perfor-
mance is near ceiling for all cue-to-match distances, which may
hide some cue-distance dependence. The only exception was for
cue position 1, that is, when the cue was the very first sample at the
beginning of the trial. Here, performance was somewhat poorer,
for every trial length (and cue-match distance). This may be due
to an interaction between the representations in infero-temporal
(IT) and pre-frontal (pF) cortex, as described in the Discussion.
Note that the first image is special in that it can never be the
reward-producing match stimulus.
False positives. Since monkeys D and L were tested with novel
images, they were never presented with a repetition of images
from previous trials. This was strictly adhered to during training,
as the monkeys learned the task. However, in order to estimate
how novel images persist in memory through the sequence of
trials, during testing we introduced “catch trials,” as follows: in
each testing session we intentionally repeated one randomly cho-
sen image from 1, 2, 5, and 10 trials back. Thus, in each session
only four catch trials were presented, so that fewer than 5% of tri-
als contained a catch image. This experiment was conducted over
30 sessions for each monkey, so that catch images were shown 30
times for each back distance, for eachmonkey, (though, of course,
not the same ones). This stringent limitation was set so that the
monkeys would not learn to expect such trials.
The “catch image” was used only as a sample and was never
repeated at the end of the test trial as a match. However, it could
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have been the cue and match in its previous n-back trial. In such
conditions, any image may potentially be shown a maximum of
three times: cue and match in a previous trial, and sample image
in the “catch trial.”
The results for monkeys D and L catch-trial FPs reveal a sur-
prising ability for Novel images used in this experiment to survive
through the sequence of trials. Images seen 1-trial-back provoked
80% FPs, 2-trials-back, 66%, and 5-trials-back, 38%. Even 10-
trials-back, previously seen images elicited 10% FP errors, while
generally unseen images only produced 1.5% FP errors, as shown
in Figure 3B. Since each of the two monkeys was tested for 30
catch trials per distance back, every point in Figure 3B has a
sample size of ∼60, sufficient for statistical analysis.
ESTIMATING RATE OF FORGETTING
The NST group never experienced repeated images from previ-
ous trials during training for Experiment I. We suggest that they
did not develop an inter-trial reset mechanism. This gives us the
unique opportunity to estimate natural memory decay for viewed
images without reset. In Figure 4 we plot FP Rate (%) as a func-
tion of time between first (prior) presentation of the image and
catch-trial presentation. The green line shows the result of fit-
ting a binomial generalized linear model with logarithmic link
function to the raw data of FPs and correct rejections as a func-
tion of time. This yields the fit FP = exp (−0.18 ∗ t), (where FP
is the False Positive rate and t is in seconds). This corresponds
to a decay factor of about 1/3 per min. In Figure 4, each red
dot represents average time and FP rate for data in exponen-
tially increasing time intervals and the black triangles represent
the averages for the data at each of the 1, 2, 5, and 10 back posi-
tions. Y-axis values are the same as in Figure 3B, but the X-axis
represents physical time (instead of number of trials back). Note
that black triangle or red dot average data were not used for the
fitting calculation. We find that visual memory in monkeys grad-
ually decreases, so that during this multiple-item discrimination
FIGURE 4 | Memory decay in the case where no reset mechanism has
been activated. The raw false positive (FP) and correct rejection (CR) data
were fit to time between first image presentation and its repetition using a
binomial generalized linear model with logarithmic link function yielding
FP = exp (−0.18 ∗ t), (t in seconds) or a decay factor of about 1/3 per min.
Red dots correspond to FP rate and time average for data in exponentially
increasing time intervals. Black triangles correspond to FP rate and time
average over the data in 1, 2, 5, and 10 trials back. Neither of these
averages was used for the fitting calculation.
task, even 10 trials later (almost 2min, on average), about 10%
of the on-average 44 images presented remain stored in memory
and produce FP errors—more than five times the spontaneous
FP rate!
EXPERIMENT II
In Experiment II, monkey behavior for the DMMS task was tested
by switching stimulus sets between monkey groups. Thus, Group
FST switched to the unlimited novel image set (used by Group
NST in Experiment I), and Group NST switched to the fixed
image set used by Group FST in Experiment I. There was no
adaptive pre-training for either group.
Group FST
Performance. Performance of monkeys B and T with the unlim-
ited set of novel images (over 4,751 trials) was significantly
improved compared to their performance (in Experiment I) with
the small fixed set of images (p < 0.001, for group and for each
monkey separately). Performance showed significant improve-
ment (p < 0.05) except when the cue immediately preceded
the match. Performance was similar to that of Group NST in
Experiment I (Figure 3A) and was 90% or greater, except when
the cue was at the very beginning of the trial, as demonstrated in
Figure 5A.
False positives. We asked if repeated stimuli would elicit FP
responses here, as well, as they did when monkeys D and L were
initially tested with novel images, without prior experience with
a fixed set of images. To test this, we introduced “catch trials” in
30% of trials and the repeated image could have been seen previ-
ously 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 trials back. As before, each repeated image
was shown as a “catch trial” only once, that is, each image could
be shown a maximum of three times: as cue and match in its
n-back-trial, and as sample in the “catch trial.”
Novel images seen in previous trials provoked FP errors mainly
from the 1-back adjacent trial, as shown in Figure 5B, similar to
the behavior with the fixed set of images (Figure 2B). Overall,
novel images seen in previous trials provoked a FP rate of 7%
for backward distances up to 5, compared with only 5% for
Experiment I. Over the 5 backward distances, only the first was
significantly higher for Experiment II at the 0.05 level, (p-values
FIGURE 5 | Experiment II, Group FST, now tested with novel images.
(A) Performance (Hit Rate %); note similarity to Figure 3(A) for group NST.
(B) FP rate for Group FST with novel images; Note similarity to FPs of same
FST group with a fixed image set in Figure 2(B) and, surprisingly, not to the
FPs of the NST group with novel images, shown in Figure 3(B).
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= 0.001, 0.38, 0.22, 0.84, 0.99; with similar values for each mon-
key separately). This is dramatically different from the result for
Group NST in Experiment I, where they showed ∼80% FPs. We
conclude that the previous experience of this group with a fixed
set allowed not only the possibility of avoiding FPs for the fixed
set trial type, but also allowed such avoidance for the novel set;
(see Discussion).
Group NST
Performance. Switching from novel images to a small fixed set
of images significantly impaired performance in monkeys D and
L (3,680 trials; p < 0.001; for group and monkey L; p < 0.005
for monkey D)—as already seen in Experiment I in a cross-
subject analysis. Again, as shown in Figure 6A, considering each
fixed trial length, one sees that the more intervening images
there were between cue and match, the more difficult it was to
hold the cue image in memory. Note that when cue and match
images were adjacent, performance is close to perfect—for all
trial lengths. Overall, Group NST performance with the small
fixed set of images in Experiment II is very similar to perfor-
mance of Group FST in Experiment I with the same fixed set size
(see Figure 2A).
False positives. Switching from the unlimited set of novel images
to the small fixed set dramatically influenced also the FP error
rate in monkeys D and L. Images seen in previous trials elicited
FP errors mostly when they were presented in the just preceding
1-back trial and to a small extent from 2-trials-back, as shown
in Figure 6B. Over the 5 backward distances, only the first two
were significantly higher for Experiment II at the.05 level, (p-
values= 0.001, 0.003, 0.51, 0.86, 0.43; with similar values for each
monkey separately). Thus, the FP error distribution for Group
NST in Experiment II is rather similar to that for Group FST in
Experiment I (compare Figures 2B, 6B). This reduction in FPs
occurred very quickly, presumably when the monkeys noticed the
frequently repeated images and their lack of producing reward.
FP RATE DEPENDENCE ON REWARD
We asked if the rate of FP errors depends on whether the trial
where the image originally appeared was rewarded or unrewarded
and whether it matters if the image was seen there once (as non-
cue sample) or twice (as cue and match). That is: Does reward
allow trial images to stay in memory, i.e., does reward hinder
FIGURE 6 | Experiment II, Group NST, now tested with a fixed set of 16
images. (A) Performance (Hit rate %). (B) FP rate. Note similarity to group
FST shown in Figure 2.
forgetting, and thus, increase FP errors? Is the memory strength-
ened by having seen the image twice? To estimate how reward and
double viewing influence FP errors, we analyzed data from the
experiments with the novel images, where there were many FPs.
(FP data for the cases with fixed image sets are presented in the
Supplementary Material; no significant differences were found
between groups or between previous presentation rewarded vs.
unrewarded).
For Group FST, who were initially trained with a fixed set of
images and only subsequently tested with novel images, we saw
above that the reset mechanism was transferred from the fixed set
task to the novel images task. Here we found no dependence on
reward in the previous trial. FP errors were found in 7% of catch
trials, as shown in Figure 7A. This rate was the same for catch
trials repeating an image from a trial which was successfully exe-
cuted and the monkey received a reward, or from of a trial where
the monkey missed the match or responded to a FP, and was not
rewarded. It was also the same for catch trials repeating images
that were presented as a sample (seen once), or images that were
presented as a cue and then as a match (seen twice and rewarded,
for recognizing match to cue of this image, or unrewarded, due to
missing this match).
Results were very different for Group NST, who had no pre-
vious experience with the fixed set; they started out with the
novel-images task and had no reset mechanism. Here, FP rate
was highly affected by reward. As demonstrated in Figure 7B,
catch trials with images from previously rewarded trials pro-
voked 53% FPs if they were twice-seen cue and match images and
48% FPs if they were once-seen sample images. This difference
is not significant (one-tail t-test by participant shows p = 0.34).
Looking at the cases where the previous trial was unrewarded,
we find provoked FP rates of only 29 (for twice-seen but match
missed) and 25% (once-seen and trial unrewarded due to FP
or Miss of another image). Again, the difference between twice-
and once-seen is not significant (p = 0.50), nor is the difference
between twice-seen and once-seen significant when considering
FIGURE 7 | Reward Dependence of False Positive rate for catch trials.
False Positive rate is shown for catch trials where a previously seen image
is repeated, although the monkeys are expecting all images to be novel,
except a single within-trial match repetition, to which they should respond.
The FP rate is shown for trials where the catch image was previously
presented in a trial which led to a correct response (rewarded) or not
(unrewarded) and for trials where the twice-seen cue and match image is
the one used for a catch trial (filled bar) or a once-seen sample was
repeated in the catch trial (open bar). (A) Data for Group FST. (B) Data for
Group NST. For both groups, data are shown for testing with novel images,
except the catch trials.
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both rewarded and unrewarded data (p = 0.40). However, the
difference between rewarded and unrewarded cases (Figure 7B
left vs. right) is indeed significant (p < 0.05). We conclude that
when there is no reset mechanism available, the strength of image
memory depends strongly on whether the trial in which the image
appeared was rewarded. Reward strengthens the memory trace
or synaptic strength enhancement. We return to this point in the
Discussion.
DISCUSSION
We found that learning history has a great influence on how items
are handled in monkey memory. Two groups learned the same
paradigm, with their task being to watch a sequence of images
and report repetition of any of the images within a trial. The
only difference was that one group experienced this task with a
fixed small set of 16 images, while the second group responded to
an unlimited set of images, that is, every trial was composed of
images never before shown to the monkey. The first group consis-
tently saw the same images, trial after trial, with trials composed
of images randomly selected from the fixed small set of 16 images.
This was a challenge for memory and for forgetting because the
paradigm required reporting every repetition of any image within
the current trial, while ignoring the very same images seen very
recently in previous trials. In some cases, when the current trial
had as many as 6 samples, the time between cue and test was
longer than that between a sample in the beginning of the trial
and the (perhaps matching) image at the end of the preceding
trial, a “repetition” the monkey was supposed to ignore.
Note that performance for experiments with a series of items
followed by a single test item (present or absent from the series)
displays both a recency and a primacy effect and a U-shape
(Wright et al., 1985; Wright, 1998, 2007). The primacy effect is
absent in our case, where attention and a decision must be made
for each presented image, to determine if it matches any of the
preceding images.
We suggest that to solve the problem of propagation of the
memory of previously seen images to the following trial(s), the
brain sets up an adaptive reset mechanism. The theory behind
such a reset and a model describing its action are presented in
an accompanying paper (Amit et al., 2013). In that paper we also
integrate the model for familiarity recognition of novel images
(Romani et al., 2008; Yakovlev et al., 2008), in the same net-
work that handles repetition detection for well-learned images
with Working Memory delay activity. Repetition detection with
novel images relies on a small synaptic trace of the once-seen
image, whereas with trained images it relies on their retention
in Working Memory. These two types of detection entail dif-
ferent types of readout mechanisms. We propose that the reset
mechanism, once acquired, can be applied to the novel image set-
ting, though it requires an increased depression rate to sufficiently
reduce the synaptic trace of once-seen images.
Note that it is not the presence of the match that initiates the
reset, but rather the end of the trial (indicated by motor response;
cessation of stimulus series; inter-trial interval). A physiological
associate of this event was recorded as a burst of neuronal activ-
ity in a sample of pF neurons (Yakovlev and Hochstein, 2009).
An alternative to the view that reset is the equivalent of directed
forgetting is that somehow the monkey remembers the image
but also remembers that it did not occur in the current trial
and therefore, should not respond to its reappearance. We are
not aware of physiological recordings supporting this alternative.
Furthermore, this model does not explain the difference between
1-back and further back images.
Several primate neurophysiological studies demonstrated
reduced neuronal responses when images are presented a second
time within the same trial (as a match)—called “match suppres-
sion” (Brown et al., 1987; Riches et al., 1991; Li et al., 1993;
Miller et al., 1993, 1996). On the other hand, despite suppres-
sion for within-trial repetitions, the response to an image’s first
appearance in each new trial is the same as to its original pre-
sentation (Hölscher and Rolls, 2002). This led to the conclusion
that “perirhinal cortex neurons were actively reset between tri-
als” (Hölscher and Rolls, 2002). Very recently it was observed
that inhibitory IT neurons differentiate between novel and well-
trained images (Woloszyn and Sheinberg, 2012), a signal that may
be used for establishing a reset mechanism.
Previous human and animal studies have found a difference
between multi-item memory for small vs. large stimulus set sizes
(Mishkin and Delacour, 1975; Sands and Wright, 1980; Eacott
et al., 1994; Wright, 2007; Basile and Hampton, 2010; Bigelow
and Poremba, 2013). Performance with small sets is degraded due
to what they call proactive interference, leading to FP responses.
These reports do not directly discuss reset as the mechanism for
overcoming such interference, and they do not use catch trials to
determine the absence of reset for large set sizes—where it is not
required.
Information stored in memory decays over time, but it is
still unknown whether this is merely as a result of the passage
of time or as a result of interference from new events (Wilson
and Kipp, 1998; Lewandowsky and Oberauer, 2008; Hardt et al.,
2013). Monkeys NST in experiment I were trained with no expe-
rience of repeated images from previous trials, hence they had
not developed a reset mechanism. This presented the opportunity
to estimate natural memory decay for seen images in a situation
without reset. We found that gradual decrease of memory was
best fit by an exponential function (Figure 4), consistent with
previous reports (Sperling, 1960; Ringo, 1991; Jolicoeur, 1999;
Fusi et al., 2007; Graziano and Sigman, 2008; Zylberberg et al.,
2009; Bernacchia et al., 2011; Huang and Amit, 2011; Akrami
et al., 2012). In our experiment, with monkeys performing a
multiple-item discrimination task (the DMMS task), behavioral
performance suggests that about 10% of images are still in mem-
ory after 2min. In contrast it has been found that neurons in
monkey anterior temporal lobe store information for seen images
perhaps as long as 24 h (Xiang and Brown, 1998).
Reward significantly improves memory (Wittmann et al.,
2005, 2008; Adcock et al., 2006; Bunzeck et al., 2012). In our
experiment, monkeys from group FST showed no difference in
the low rate of FP errors when the previous trial with these images
were rewarded or not. Any reward effect might be marginal for
the fixed set of well-learned images. We suggest it is not present in
Experiment II of group FST because they had developed a reset
mechanism, which presumably overwhelms the small effect of
enhanced learning due to reward. Group FST were exposed to
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the novel images after developing the reset mechanism during
sessions with a fixed set of images, so that the effect of enhanced
learning due to reward cannot be observed. On the other hand,
group NSTmonkeys, which had no reset mechanism during their
first experiment with novel images, were significantly affected
by reward. This seems to indicate that reward boosts image
learning, perhaps through faster or greater synaptic potentiation.
Thus, imagemeaning, behavioral response, or reward acquisition,
enhances memory, though the effect is only observed for novel
images.
We noted in the Results that performance was always poorer
when the cue was the very first sample at the beginning of the
trial, except when the Match immediately followed. Physiological
studies in our lab found that there is delay activity in both IT
and pF cortex. These have very different characteristics, however,
in the context of multi-image memory tasks. IT delay activity
is related to the last presented image, it is turned off by pre-
sentation of a new image, and it survives the inter-trial-interval
(Yakovlev et al., 1998). pF delay activity survives presentation of
a new image, so that multiple images can be actively remem-
bered together (Miller et al., 1996), and, we now show, it is turned
off at trial end. We propose that an interaction between the IT
and pF representations leads to the anomalous results for cue
position 1.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
It has been found that multiple presentations of an image (such
as the small fixed set used here), allow for development of delay-
activity Working Memory. We propose that the visual system
uses this type of memory mechanism to perform our DMMS
task. This is also consistent with the performance decrease with
Cue-to-Match distance, deriving from spontaneous forgetting of
items, i.e., their dropping out of delay-activity. A major problem
with performing this task is the need to remember only items of
the current trial, and to forget—i.e., not to respond—to items
seen recently, perhaps even in the 1-back trial. We propose a
reset mechanism that turns off the delay activity between trials.
This may be related to “directed forgetting,” a subject previously
addressed without reference to specific underlying neural mech-
anisms (e.g., Bjork, 1972; Wilson and Kipp, 1998; Williams and
Woodman, 2012; Williams et al., 2013), though in our case no
explicit instruction is given to “forget” items from previous tri-
als. For a recent review of active vs. passive forgetting, see (Hardt
et al., 2013).
Performance with Novel images was surprisingly better than
with the Fixed Set, and was independent of Cue-to-Match dis-
tance. We hypothesize (Yakovlev et al., 2008; Amit et al., 2013)
that the same learning mechanism that builds synaptic strength
to produce delay activity is also in operation here, though leaving
a much weaker trace. Thus, the readout mechanism for detecting
familiarity of once-seen images has to be different. For example,
we predict that in this case monkeys will not learn associa-
tions, such as among sequential images (Sakai and Miyashita,
1991). Furthermore, since there were no repeated images (no
catch trials) during training, there was no need to establish a
reset mechanism. Indeed, when we introduced a small number
of “catch” trials, we found a very large number of FP responses.
Since there was no opportunity to learn to forget, the monkeys
had a hard time forgetting.
Strikingly, when monkeys were trained first with a fixed set
of images and established a reset mechanism, when they were
switched to the novel images task, they were able to use this
acquired reset mechanism for once-seen images as well. Catch
trials induced only a limited number of FPs, mainly confined to
images from the preceding trial. This finding suggests that reset is
not just turning off delay activity—since there is no delay activity
expected for novel images. Instead, we must conclude that reset
also affects the synaptic structure initiated by seeing an image
once, the synaptic structure that is responsible for a different
response when a once-seen image is seen a second time.
Finally, we observed that monkeys without a reset mechanism
easily remember dozens of once-seen images, with a fixed rate of
decrease in repetition detection over time, and they are affected
by the presence or absence of reward in previous trials.
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